Flash Loans
Why flash loans?
It runs in one tx
What began as a hackathon test harness for flash loans is now a full program on Solana — borrow, use and repay all live in one transaction. If the repay ever fails, the whole thing simply never happened. So we built everything around that.
so we built
flash loans
Enter
Wedesak
As they should be
Wedesak is an open, on-chain program that turns idle SOL into atomic credit in a single transaction. Test every path with the test kit, and keep everything permissionless on Solana. Powered by $WEDESA.
Building on Wedesak? Open the composer or read the docs.
01
One line borrow — borrow()
02
Tests beside your code, same repo, same CI
03
Cheatcodes: warp, prank, deal
04
Repay checked before the transaction closes
05
Borrow SOL and any SPL token
06
Composes with any program
07
Atomic
(or it never happened)
Borrow. Use. Repay.
Three instructions in one transaction. The program only lends if it can already see the repay.

- 01
Borrow
The first instruction pulls liquidity from the vault. Before a single lamport moves, the program reads the Instructions sysvar and refuses to run unless a matching repay sits later in the same transaction.
- 02
Use
Everything in between is yours: route through two pools, repay a position, swap collateral. Borrow and repay stay top-level instructions, so your own program never has to be called back.
- 03
Repay
The last instruction returns principal plus 1 bp. Short by one lamport and the whole transaction reverts — nothing was ever borrowed.
use wedesak::cpi::{borrow, repay};
// ix[0] wedesak::borrow — checks ix[n] is a repay for the same vault
// ix[1..n-1] your instructions
// ix[n] wedesak::repay — principal + fee, or the tx reverts
let ixs = vec![
wedesak::ix::borrow(vault, user, 250 * ONE_SOL),
route_a.swap(SOL, USDC),
route_b.swap(USDC, SOL),
wedesak::ix::repay(vault, user),
];54% → <1%
Share of DeFi losses from flash-loan attacks, 2020 vs 2025
Source · Immunefi
$160M+
Deposits exposed by a lender-side flash-loan bug, patched Sept 2025 with no loss
Source · Asymmetric Research
$7.5B
Flash-loan volume through a single lender in three months, mid-2025
Source · Cryptonews
$100
Fee on a $1M flash loan at 1 bp — against $500 at the Aave V3 default
Source · Aave docs
1 bp. That’s it.
Atomic arbitrage lives on a few basis points of edge, so a fee priced in tenths of a percent eats the trade. Wedesak charges one basis point of principal, all of it paid to vault depositors — no origination fee, no keeper cut, nothing on reverted transactions.
| Protocol | VM | Flash fee | How repayment is enforced |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wedesak | SVM | 0.01% · 100% to depositors | Borrow reads the Instructions sysvar; one matching top-level repay required, nested borrows rejected |
| Kamino Lend | SVM | Per reserve (0.001% documented) | Introspection: one borrow, one matching repay, nested calls rejected |
| marginfi | SVM | 0% | Start/end flags; end must be the last step, then a health check |
| Jupiter Lend | SVM | 0% | Borrow → your steps → payback in one transaction |
| Aave V3 | EVM | 0.05% default (governance-set) | Callback, then the pool pulls principal + fee |
| Morpho | EVM | 0% | Callback, then pulls back the exact amount |
| Balancer V3 | EVM | 0% | Vault reverts unless every debt nets to zero |
Fees as published in each protocol’s docs, November 2026. Governance can change them.
Questions we get
The borrow instruction reads the Instructions sysvar before it moves anything. If there is no Wedesak repay later in the same transaction — same vault, same borrower, principal plus fee — it errors and the runtime rolls the whole transaction back.
Cross-program invocation depth is capped at 4 and a program cannot be called back into itself mid-chain, so there is no callback. Keeping both ends top-level is what lets the program see the repay before lending. Borrows made through CPI are rejected.
Up to the free liquidity of the reserve, one borrow per transaction. In practice the limit is the transaction itself: 1,400,000 compute units and 1,232 bytes for the borrow, your route and the repay together. The composer budgets all three before you sign.
Depositors. One basis point of every repaid loan accrues to the reserve it came from; nothing is charged on a reverted transaction.
It runs your program and the loan in-process on a local runtime. You can warp to any slot or timestamp, seed or overwrite accounts, deal tokens to any address and sign as another key — then assert the repay path and the revert path in plain Rust.
No. Borrowing only needs a wallet that can pay the transaction fee. $WEDESA is the protocol token described in the whitepaper.
Still stuck? The docs cover every instruction and error code.